26.05.090 Justification

(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided, justification or excuse under this chapter is a defense.

(b) If a person is justified or excused in using force against another, but he/she recklessly or negligently injures or creates a risk of injury to other persons, the justifications afforded by this chapter are unavailable in a prosecution for such recklessness or negligence.

(c) That conduct may be justified or excused within the meaning of this chapter does not abolish or impair any remedy by such conduct which is available in any civil action.

(d) No person can be punished for an otherwise illegal act when the act is committed in an emergency or protect life, limb or property.

(e) Any damage resulting from such emergency act must be reasonable compared to the person need.

(f) The person committing the emergency act under the Good Samaritan law which grants immunity, if the Good Samaritan makes and error while delivering emergency medical care, he/she cannot be held legally liable for the damages in Court. However, two conditions usually must be met;

(1) the aid must be given at the scene of the emergency, and

(2) if the Good Samaritan has other motives, such as the hope of being paid a fee or reward, then the law will not apply.

(g) When law enforcement officers are by, this chapter, authorized to act in the prevention of public offenses, other persons, who by a law enforcement official's command, act in their aid, are justified in so doing. Such other persons shall be entitled to employ the same degree of force as provided for in of this chapter herein and shall not be liable.

(h) When a person's conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt under Section 26.09.010 of this chapter, it is an affirmative defense that he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose. The establishment of such defense does not, however, affect the liability of an accomplice who did not join in such abandonment or prevention.

(i) Within the meaning of this chapter, abandonment of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of the actor's course of conduct, which increases the probability of detection or apprehension or which make more difficult in the accomplishment of the criminal purpose. Abandonment is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim.